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Abstract 
This paper examines the logical problem of language acquisition drawing upon an 
experimental study on children’s knowledge of anaphoric one by Lidz, Waxman and 
Freedman (2003). The finding was that, upon being presented with the instruction “Look! A 
yellow bottle. Do you see another one?”, 18-month-old children prefer to look at a yellow 
bottle rather than to a bottle of a different color. According to Lidz et al. (2003), the results 
that children cannot interpret one as anaphoric to head nouns. We point out that the 
experimental findings are not explained under the hypothesis offered by the authors of that 
study. Secondly, we consider whether, under current assumptions, children’s knowledge of 
anaphoric one can be inferred from the properties of the final state. Thirdly, we reaffirm the 
validity of the Poverty of the Stimulus argument, despite the challenge posed by the learning 
model proposed by Regier and Gahl (2004). Finally, we draw upon recent psycholinguistic 
work to propose an explanation for the findings documented by Lidz et al. (2003) that is 
independent from – though consistent with – their knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric 
one. 
1. On that One Experiment 
This paper is concerned with the acquisition of anaphoric one as a case study 
for the Poverty of the Stimulus argument. Consider the examples below, due  
to Baker (1978). 
(1) *The student of chemistry was more thoroughly prepared than the one 
of physics  
(2) The student with short hair is taller than the one with long hair  
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In order to account for the contrast above, Baker (1978) argued that one 
cannot be anaphoric to the head noun N° (see also Hornstein and Lightfoot, 
1981). Thus, sentence (1) is ungrammatical because one has targeted the head 
noun student and not the N’ student of chemistry. By contrast, (2) is 
acceptable, because the relevant prepositional phrase is an adjunct rather than 
a complement. Prepositional adjuncts like with short hair introduce a second 
N’ element; hence one can target an N’ that excludes the prepositional phrase, 
namely the lower N’.  
The properties of anaphoric one were used by Baker (1978) and Hornstein 
and Lightfoot (1981) as a case study for the Poverty of the Stimulus argument. 
Baker (1978) and Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981) highlighted the mismatch 
that exists between a child’s experience and his linguistic competence. In 
order to evaluate this claim, Lidz et al. (2003) attempted to provide an explicit 
characterization of the child’s experience and linguistic competence. 
Before we consider the Lidz et al. study, one caveat is in order. For 
expository purposes, we will adopt here the syntactic structure and the 
characterization of anaphoric one assumed by Lidz et al. (2003). More 
specifically, along with Lidz et al. (2003), we will assume that determiners 
occur in the specifier of NPs, rather than as the heads of a Determiner Phrase 
(see Abney, 1987). Similarly, with Lidz et al. (2003), we will assume that the 
behavior of anaphoric one can be described by the following constraint: one 
cannot be anaphoric to a head noun N°. Both of these assumptions are 
controversial. In particular, the literature offers several alternative accounts of 
anaphoric one (see Llombart-Huesca, 2002; Panagioditis, 2003; Schuetze, 
2001 a.o.). For present purposes, it does not seem necessary to dwell on the 
issue. Assuming that there is a constraint, the issue is whether that constraint 
is innately specified or learned on the basis of experience.  
Lidz et al.’s contribution is two-fold. Firstly, in order to characterize the 
primary linguistic data, Lidz et al. (2003) performed a corpus analysis of the 
parental speech to Adam (Brown, 1973) and Nina (Suppes, 1974) from the 
CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000). Secondly, they conducted an 
experiment using the intermodal preferential looking paradigm (see Spelke, 
1979 and Golinkoff, Hirsch-Pasek, Cauley and Gordon, 1987).  
The experiment conducted by Lidz et al. (2003) was designed to answer 
the question of whether “infants know that one is anaphoric to the phrasal 
category N’ and thus that the NP has a hierarchical (rather than flat) structure” 
(Lidz et al. 2003; p. B69). 24 English-speaking 18-month-old children were 
tested and the experiment consisted of two phases. In the familiarization 
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phase, children watched the image of a single object on a monitor (e.g., a 
yellow bottle). At this stage, children only heard ‘neutral’ descriptions such as 
“Look! A yellow bottle.” Following the familiarization phase, children were 
presented with a testing phase in which pairs of images were shown on the 
monitor (e.g., a yellow bottle and a blue bottle). The linguistic stimuli that 
accompanied this display differed depending on the condition to which 
children had been assigned. Children in the control condition heard “Now 
look. What do you see now?”, whereas children in the anaphoric condition 
heard “Now look. Do you see another one?”. The control condition allowed 
the experimenters to determine whether subjects have any reasons to prefer 
looking at one particular object when either object can be the intended 
referent, as far as linguistic information goes. The crucial case is the anaphoric 
condition. This is what Lidz et al. (2003; p. B70) say:  
“if infants represent the NP with flat structure, and therefore 
interpret one as anaphoric to the category N°, then both images 
would be potential referents of the noun (bottle). In this case the 
linguistic stimulus is underinformative with regard to the test 
images, and so infants should reveal the same pattern of 
performance as in the control condition.”1  
The finding documented by Lidz et al. (2003) is that, in the anaphoric 
condition (i.e., “Look now. Do you see another one?”), subjects did not 
behave at chance. In the anaphoric condition, subjects looked at the familiar 
object (i.e., the yellow bottle). The conclusion drawn by Lidz et al. (2003; p. 
B72) is that: 
“In the domain of anaphoric reference, learnability considerations 
lead to the conclusion that learners never consider the possibility 
that an element could be anaphoric to N°. (…). This logical 
conclusion is now supported by corpus analysis and by 
experimentation with infants.” 
Similarly, Lidz and Waxman (2004; p. 165) claim that: 
                                                
1 Alternatively, one could claim that children will respond in the same way they would 
respond to an instruction like “Now look. Do you see another bottle?”. To find out how 
children would respond to such an instruction, one only needs to look at the control 
experiment presented by Lidz et al. (2003): children respond at chance (i.e., they take either 
object to be a possible target). 
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“By the time they are 18-months old, infants have an articulated, 
nested, structure for the Noun Phrase and they know that one can 
be anaphoric only to phrasal categories.”  
In our view, this conclusion does not follow from the experimental evidence 
presented by Lidz et al. (2003). Furthermore, even if we credited children with 
knowledge of the properties of anaphoric one (on independent grounds), there 
would still be no explanation for the experimental findings. 
In analogy with the tree diagram used by Lidz et al. (2003), we can take 
the phrase structure of the noun phrase a yellow bottle to be the following. 
 
(3)         NP 
       
    N’ 
Det          
   Adj      N’ 
 
 
     N° 
 
 
   a yellow bottle 
The structure in (3) contains two N’s. This is because the phrase structure rule 
that allows the insertion of an adjective can be repeated (in order to generate 
noun phrases containing more than one adjective such as the big yellow bottle) 
(see Lidz and Waxman, 2004). Assuming that one targets N’s, either N’ is a 
suitable target. The acceptability of (4) and the ambiguity of (5) depend on 
either N’ being able to serve as a target. 
(4) John has a yellow bottle and I have a blue one 
(5) John has a yellow bottle and I have another one2 
                                                
2 An anonymous reviewer expresses doubts about the presence of an ambiguity in (5) (see 
Lidz and Waxman, 2004 for the claim that an ambiguity is present). There is no question 
that associating one with the lower N’ is a much dispreferred option. Nevertheless, if it 
turned that (5) is unambiguous, this fact would not be explained by the generalization in 
(6). In other words, as far as the generalization under consideration is concerned, we must 
assume that both N’s are potential candidates for anaphoric one. This does not mean that 
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The consequence of the phrase structure in (3) for the experiment is that, upon 
hearing a sentence like “Look now. Do you see another one?”, even children 
who have knowledge of the relevant constraint could interpret it to mean “Do 
you see another bottle?” just like they could interpret it to mean “Do you see 
another yellow bottle?”. Given that either N’ is a suitable antecedent for 
anaphoric one, the question is: what should subjects do when two N’s are 
available? The answer is very simple: we don’t know. 
The relevance of the syntactic structure in (3) for the experiment was 
overlooked by Lidz et al. (2003). In describing the design of their experiment 
Lidz et al. (2003; p. B70) write: 
“if infants represent the NP with a nested structure, and interpret 
one as anaphoric to N’, then they should reveal a preference for 
the (only) image that is picked out by N’ (the yellow bottle).”  
As we saw, the syntactic structure that Lidz et al. (2003) give us contains two 
N’s; there is no single object corresponding to ‘the (only) image that is picked 
out by N’.’ As far as we know, the experimenter has no way of predicting the 
behavior of a subject who knows the properties of anaphoric one. 
We seem to have reached an impasse. Part of the problem comes from the 
fact that Lidz et al. (2003) and Lidz and Waxman (2004) conflate two 
different issues: (i) knowledge of the internal structure of Noun Phrases and 
(ii) knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one. As it turns out, the 
experimental evidence is consistent with the existence of an intermediate level 
N’ in children’s noun phrases, which can be targeted by anaphoric one. By 
contrast, despite Lidz et al.’s and Lidz and Waxman’s claim, the experimental 
results do not support children’s knowledge of the properties of anaphoric one.  
In light of the discussion above, one might ask whether the experimental 
results could provide evidence against children’s knowledge of the constraint 
on anaphoric one. To illustrate, consider the syntactic structure in (3). Given 
that there are two N’s and children could take either N’ as the antecedent of 
one, we should expect chance behavior. But we do not see chance behavior. 
Thus, it could be argued that the data offered by Lidz et al. (2003) provide 
evidence against children’s knowledge of the properties of anaphoric one. 
                                                                                                                                               
there can’t be other factors that make the upper N’ the preferred option. We will consider 
some of these factors in the concluding section of the paper. For the time being, this means 
that Lidz et al.’s findings suggest that young children have access to the mechanism of 
ambiguity resolution that explains the preference of the upper N’, whatever that mechanism 
might be. 
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This would also be inaccurate, however. In particular, this reasoning is flawed 
on two counts. First of all, this reasoning assumes that the two N’s are equally 
accessible. Given what we know about ambiguity resolution, it would be very 
surprising if children had no (linguistic or non-linguistic) reasons to prefer one 
reading of the relevant question over the other. Second, suppose for the sake 
of the argument that in the present case the two readings were indeed equally 
available. It still remains unclear how a subject should behave. In fact, equal 
probability in selecting either N’ in the syntactic representation does not 
translate as equal probability in looking at either object, because one reading 
of the question posed to subjects is associated with only one object in the 
visual display and the other reading is associated with two objects in the visual 
display. If children select the upper N’, they should look at the yellow bottle; 
if children select the lower N’, they could look at either bottle. This makes it 
difficult to establish what would count as chance behavior in the present 
experiment. At the very least, if one wanted to use Lidz et al.’s findings to cast 
doubt on children’s knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one, one would 
also need to know what children would do in a comparable control condition 
(e.g., a condition in which two readings are available, one reading is 
associated with one object in the visual display and one reading is associated 
with both objects in the visual display). The choice of such control condition 
might turn out to be quite difficult, given how little we know about ambiguity 
resolution in 18-month-old children. For these reasons, we will conclude here 
that the experiment conducted by Lidz et al. (2003) cannot be used to 
investigate one of the issues that they wanted to investigate, namely children’s 
knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one. Lidz and Waxman (2004; p. 
158) write: “Our original argument, following Baker, 1978, went like this. The 
acquirendum is the knowledge that one is anaphoric only to syntactic 
constituents larger than N° (i.e., the phrasal categories N’ or NP).” Our claim 
is that when it comes to that acquirendum, the experimental findings are 
uninformative. 
Given that Lidz et al.’s experiment does not speak to one of the issues that 
they had hoped to address, a possible approach would be for us to design an 
experiment that would speak to that issue. Unfortunately, the experimental 
findings offered by Lidz et al. (2003) would make the results of such an 
experiment quite difficult to interpret.  
Suppose an experiment was constructed for which different behavior is 
expected depending on whether or not the subject knows the constraint on 
anaphoric one. This could be achieved if infants were presented with two 
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objects; one object corresponding to the head noun and one corresponding to 
the N’. Then, suppose that upon being presented with linguistic stimuli 
containing anaphoric one, children displayed a robust preference for the object 
corresponding to the N’ constituent. Ordinarily, such a result could be 
interpreted as showing that children know the relevant constraint. 
Unfortunately, the results provided by Lidz et al. (2003) might make this 
conclusion problematic. In particular, the fact that children display a 
preference even when a preference is not predicted suggests that some 
unknown factor is at play.3 At the moment, we would have no way of 
excluding the possibility that children’s behavior in the experiment we are 
hypothesizing would be triggered by that unknown factor and not by 
knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one. 
To sum up, Lidz and Waxman (2004)’s use of the experimental evidence 
documented by Lidz et al. (2003) as an illustration of children’s knowledge of 
anaphoric one is unwarranted. That experiment does not bear on the issue of 
whether children know that one cannot target the head noun and, if anything, 
the experimental results documented by Lidz et al. (2003) point to a 
confounding factor that would need to be taken into consideration when 
conducting any experiment on children’s knowledge of the constraint on 
anaphoric one. Given the unavailability of experimental evidence, we are 
forced to consider alternative sources of evidence. One viable alternative is an 
argument that rests on logical grounds, the argument from the Poverty of the 
Stimulus.  
2. Anaphoric One and the Logical Problem of Language Acquisition 
As we said above, the experiment conducted by Lidz et al. did not offer 
evidence regarding children’s knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one. 
Let us now consider whether evidence for this conclusion could come from 
adult speakers of English. In this section, we will highlight the relevance of 
anaphoric one as case study for the logical problem of language acquisition. 
We will conclude this section by briefly discussing the role of semantic 
evidence in language acquisition, and we will illustrate how the acquisition of 
anaphoric one could, in principle, be turned into an empirical problem. 
The argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus claims that if adult 
speakers of English have the state of knowledge represented in (6) (see 
                                                
3 We will consider two hypotheses about children’s preference in the concluding part of the 
paper. 
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Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981; p.20)), then children must start off from the 
same hypothesis.  
(6) rules referring to the identity of two elements apply only to major 
categories, i.e., with one or more bars. 
The logical problem of language acquisition follows from the observation 
that some (incorrect) hypotheses could only be abandoned on the basis of 
negative evidence (see Chomsky, 1980). For instance, even a sentence that 
unambiguously points to N’ as the intended antecedent of anaphoric one might 
not allow the child to recover from the hypothesis that one can refer to any 
element in the noun phrase (see Lasnik and Uriagereka, 2002 for a similar 
argument in a different domain). 
It is important to notice that in the present case the learner cannot even 
avail himself of the Uniqueness Principle (see Pinker, 1984; Wexler and 
Culicover, 1980). As Fodor and Crowther (2002) recently showed, the 
Uniqueness Principle exploits the assumption that there should be at most one 
form for any intended meaning. Thus, as Fodor and Crowther (2002) argue, 
the Uniqueness Principle turns out to be useless when there is no alternative 
form that could stand in competition with the form hypothesized by the child 
or when the target grammar actually licenses an ambiguity, thereby violating 
the assumption that there should be exactly one form for any given meaning. 
The case of anaphoric one seems to satisfy both requirements. There is no 
form that can only be anaphoric to head nouns and that could be used to 
eliminate the head noun N° from the set of possible options for one; moreover, 
sentences containing one can be associated with more than one meaning, 
depending on whether one is anaphoric to the entire noun phrase or to any of 
the N’s available in the relevant noun phrase. 
Let us go back to the child’s task. The question is how the child avoids 
any hypothesis that would prevent him from reaching (6). According to one 
line of research, Universal Grammar prevents the child from entertaining any 
hypothesis that would make the target generalization unattainable on the basis 
of positive evidence. Certain hypotheses must be excluded from the child’s 
hypothesis space, in order to ensure that the correct hypothesis can be 
acquired on the basis of positive evidence. To illustrate, suppose that (6) is not 
part of the initial state and that the child initially assumes that one is anaphoric 
to the head noun N°. Upon encountering an utterance in which one is 
unambiguously anaphoric to N’, the child could simply modify his hypothesis 
and assume that one can be anaphoric to N’ or to N°. In other words, positive 
evidence of the kind described above can lead the child to expand the set of 
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elements that one can be anaphoric to, but it cannot lead the child to expunge 
any member from that set. 
On the assumption that negative evidence is not available, children will 
hear no ungrammatical sentence labeled as such (see Marcus, 1993). For 
example, children will not hear sentence (1) together with an indication that 
that sentence is ungrammatical. The absence of explicit information about 
ungrammatical sentences makes it impossible for the child to learn that 
anaphoric one cannot be anaphoric to a head noun. If (6) is indeed part of the 
linguistic competence of all native speakers of English, given the lack of 
negative evidence, it must be the case that (6) is also part of the linguistic 
competence of any child, prior to experience.  
It is important to stress the importance of the argument above for the 
debate sparked by the publication of Lidz et al. (2003). Once we take into 
consideration some of the properties of the final state, it is not even necessary 
to look at the properties of the input. We have known since the work of Brown 
and Hanlon (1970) that the input does not contain negative evidence. When it 
comes to the constraint on anaphoric one, the input isn’t impoverished, the 
input is non-existent. 
The discussion above highlights one important point. When analyzing the 
primary linguistic data in search of information that would lead children to 
acquire adult competence, it is important to take into account the particular 
hypothesis about the adult state that is put forward. In the present case, the 
acquirendum is a constraint. Utterances that conform to a constraint do not 
provide evidence for it. To achieve that result, the learner would need to have 
access to negative evidence, which is unavailable to children. Thus, under 
current assumptions, the acquisition of anaphoric one represents an argument 
for the logical problem of language acquisition. 
We would like to discuss briefly what could turn the acquisition of 
anaphoric one into an empirical rather than a logical problem. In principle, this 
could be achieved, if one could make use of semantic negative evidence (see 
Baker (1978) for a discussion of how this could apply to the case of anaphoric 
one), which unlike syntactic negative evidence might turn out to be available. 
In essence, one could argue that children would learn the constraint on 
anaphoric one on the basis of utterances in which two requirements are 
satisfied: one refers to N’ and it can be inferred from the speaker’s 
contribution that one cannot refer to the head noun N°. To date, there is no 
explicit proposal about how this could be achieved, but one possibility is the 
dialogue below (see also Baker, 1978). 
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(7) Speaker A: Yesterday, you met a student of syntax. Have you met 
another one today? 
Speaker B: No, I haven’t met another one! Today, I met a student of 
pragmatics. 
Let us consider what the learner could infer from hearing the dialogue above. 
One conclusion is straightforward: one can refer to the constituent student of 
syntax. The second conclusion is the following: on the assumption that 
Speaker B was trying to be charitable, one could infer that Speaker B has no 
choice but to interpret one in Speaker A’s utterance as referring to the N’ 
constituent student of syntax. In turn, we could infer that it is not possible for 
Speaker B to interpret one in Speaker A’s utterance as referring to the head 
noun N° student.  
This reasoning abstracts away from other parsing preferences that could 
enter into play. As we will see in the concluding section of the paper, it is 
reasonable to assume that in presence of an ambiguity for one, listeners draw 
upon different parsing mechanisms. The influence of these parsing 
mechanisms can be quite strong. Thus, a listener might refrain from accessing 
an antecedent for one that is contextually irrelevant, even though that 
antecedent would not lead to a violation of the constraint in (6). For instance, 
it is not clear whether a speaker would respond ‘yes’ to a request that included 
an adjunct rather than a complement (e.g., “Yesterday, you met a student with 
long hair. Have you met another one today?”) In sum, although one cannot 
rule out on principled grounds the possibility that children make use of 
dialogues like the one above, more research is needed to determine whether 
that possibility is empirically grounded. In turn, this means that we need to 
investigate whether children would be capable of using the information 
described above and whether this kind of information is available to them. 
This finally takes us to the corpus analysis performed by Lidz et al. 
(2003). These authors found only two utterances that pointed unambiguously 
to N’ as the antecedent of anaphoric one. Moreover, Lidz et al. (2003) found 
that utterances that pointed unambiguously to N’ as the antecedent of 
anaphoric one were outnumbered by ungrammatical sentences (containing 
one). Unfortunately Lidz et al. (2003) do not provide us with the two 
examples they found, so we can’t tell if those utterances would qualify as the 
data needed by the mechanism described above. For instance, as Lidz et al. 
(2003) argue, in a context in which Max has a blue ball, (8) would count as 
unambiguous evidence that one is being intended as referring to the N’ red 
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ball, but does not necessarily mean that the speaker could not possibly also 
take one to refer to the head noun ball. 
(8) Chris has a red ball but Max doesn’t have one. 
It is possible that the speaker could take one to refer to the head noun N° ball 
but is not doing so on the present occasion, just like he can presumably take 
one to refer to the N’ ball but is not doing so on the present occasion.4 This 
demonstrates that the utterances in which one refers unambiguously to N’ may 
not count as utterances in which one refers unambiguously to N’ and could not 
possibly refer to N°. Thus, we can be confident in saying that the data that 
would provide negative semantic evidence for the constraint on anaphoric one 
occur at most with a frequency that is lower than noise.  
3. Anaphoric One and the Role of Indirect Negative Evidence 
An interesting contribution to the debate on anaphoric one comes from Regier 
and Gahl (2004). In their study, Regier and Gahl (2004) present the results of 
a Bayesian learning procedure designed to mirror Lidz et al.’s findings. The 
results are interpreted as showing that it is possible to learn that anaphoric one 
refers to the ‘upper N’,’ given the kind of sentences available to children. 
According to Regier and Gahl (2004), the results of the learning procedure 
cast doubt on the implications of the study by Lidz et al. (2003). More 
importantly, one might argue, their learning procedure also casts doubt on the 
argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus as we have presented it above.  
The indirect learning procedure envisioned by Regier and Gahl (2004) 
allows the learner to adjudicate between different hypotheses that are 
consistent with the data, by taking into account the probability of observing 
the data under each competing hypothesis (see Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 
2001). The hypotheses considered by Regier and Gahl (2004) are listed below. 
(9) a. one refers to [N’ yellow bottle] as specified by a nested structure 
b. one refers to [N’ bottle] as specified by a nested structure 
c. one refers to [N° bottle] as specified by a nested structure 
d. one refers to [N° bottle] as specified by a flat structure 
                                                
4 It is possible that the dialogue in (7) is subject to the same consideration, even though the 
issue is most relevant in the case of (8). This is because the presence of two N’s readily 
shows the listener that he should not take the speaker’s choice to use one as referring to a 
particular syntactic object as dictated by the lack of viable alternatives, since at least one 
alternative is available.  
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To illustrate, imagine we only have two bottles: a yellow bottle and a blue 
bottle. Suppose the learner encounters one clear instance of anaphoric one 
used to refer to a yellow bottle. This outcome is consistent with any one of the 
hypotheses listed above. However, under each hypothesis, the available 
evidence has a different probability of occurring. In fact, we can state the 
probability of observing the evidence under each hypothesis. 
(10) a.  if one refers to [N’ yellow bottle] as specified by a nested 
structure, then the probability of one referring to the yellow bottle 
available in the context is 1 
b. if one refers to [N’ bottle] as specified by a nested structure, then 
the probability of one referring to the yellow bottle available in 
the context is 0.5 
c. if one refers to [N° bottle] as specified by a nested structure then 
the probability of one referring to the yellow bottle available in 
the context is 0.5 
d. if one refers to [N° bottle] as specified by a flat structure then the 
probability of one referring to the yellow bottle available in the 
context is 0.5 
It is important to observe that one single instance of positive data (knowing 
that one refers to the yellow bottle available in the context) yields a different 
probability of observing the available evidence if any of the hypotheses in 
(9b)-‎(9d) was true, while leaving untouched the probability of observing the 
evidence if (9a) was true. The consequences of this difference in probability 
are even more dramatic if the learner can count on several cases of anaphoric 
one being used to refer to the yellow bottle available in the context. Regier 
and Gahl (2004) observe that even if one assumes that all the relevant 
hypotheses were equally probable before observing the evidence, after 
observing five instances of one being used as anaphoric to the yellow bottle, 
an experience that would be the only outcome expected under (9a) but one of 
the 32 outcomes compatible with (9b) - (9d), the difference in probability 
could be used to adjust the relative weight of the hypotheses in (9). 
Eventually, this would justify the selection of (9a) at the expense of all the 
competing hypotheses. 
Having summarized the study by Regier and Gahl (2004), we can turn to 
the objections to that study offered by Lidz and Waxman (2004). One critique 
offered by Lidz and Waxman (2004) is that the model proposed by Regier and 
Gahl (2004) is too powerful:  
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“In short, the use of indirect negative evidence in the fashion 
proposed by R&G leads to a grammar in which it is never 
possible for one to refer to the lower of two N’s, contrary to fact. 
(p.164-165)”  
In our view this critique is undue. If children’s preference for the object that 
corresponds to the upper N’ counts as evidence for knowledge of (6), then 
Regier and Gahl (2004)’s results bear on the debate. As far as we can see, 
Regier and Gahl (2004) examined the proposal by Lidz et al. (2003) under its 
most favorable circumstances. 
As Regier and Gahl (2004) acknowledge, more results from 
computational modeling need to be examined before their possible 
contribution in modeling language acquisition can be evaluated. In particular, 
it would be important to discuss whether there are any restrictions in the way 
the hypothesis space needs to be represented. Specifically, it would be 
important to determine whether the relevant generalization could be learned 
on the basis of different data (e.g., post-nominal prepositional phrases) and 
whether that generalization could be extended to different environments. 
For the time being, however, all we can do is consider the particular 
learning model proposed by Regier and Gahl (2004). Their learning model is 
designed to mirror the findings offered by Lidz et al. (2003). Thus, just like 
we dismissed the experimental findings by Lidz et al. (2003) as irrelevant for 
the acquisition of the constraint on anaphoric one, we must dismiss the 
particular model proposed by Regier and Gahl (2004).  
Within the domain we are considering, the first question one needs to ask 
is whether the correct generalization (which implies that one can refer to any 
N’) could be learned. In our view, the answer is no. The learning model 
described by Regier and Gahl (2004) cannot learn what children acquire. 
One interesting feature of the simulation offered by Regier and Gahl 
(2004) is that the probabilities of observing the evidence under (9b)- (9d), ‘are 
identical throughout.’ This is not an accident. The relevant probabilities follow 
the same path because under any hypothesis, the probability that one stumbled 
on a yellow bottle is given by the number of yellow bottles divided by the 
number of bottles. Bottles do not come as labeled. The probability of a yellow 
bottle turning up is given by how things are in the real world and does not 
change depending on whether we are interested in bottles as corresponding to 
N’ objects or N° objects. Thus, the probability of observing the evidence will 
always be identical for all the hypotheses in (9b) - (9d). This has a crucial 
consequence for the learning algorithm. No experience will allow the learner 
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to differentiate between (9b) and (9c). In particular, no experience will allow 
the learner to reject both (9c) and (9d) and to save both (9a) and (9b), which 
could be viewed as the most straightforward way of representing knowledge 
of the fact that both N’s are suitable targets for anaphoric one. 
We would like to point out an additional issue for the approach proposed 
by Regier and Gahl (2004). According to their model, learning seems to 
proceed conservatively. The child (presumably) discards any hypothesis that 
does not account for the data. Furthermore, among the hypotheses that do 
account for the data, the child privileges the hypothesis that does not require 
improbable assumptions to ‘explain’ the evidence. On this view, it would be 
very surprising if children ended up following hypotheses for which they have 
no evidence at all. Surprisingly for the model proposed by Regier and Gahl 
(2004) and for any model that makes a similar use of indirect negative 
evidence, many studies have shown that such a scenario is very common (see 
Thornton, 1990 for a well-known illustration of this phenomenon and Meroni, 
Gualmini and Crain, 2001, for a recent review). In fact, the discovery that 
children’s grammars often differ from the grammar of the local community 
and still do not exceed the boundaries of Universal Grammar has led to the 
Continuity Hypothesis, which arguably constitutes the strongest version of the 
innateness hypothesis (Crain and Thornton, 1998; Crain, 1991; Crain and 
Pietroski, 2001).  
4. Anaphoric One and the Distinction between Language Acquisition and 
Language Use 
The previous sections reviewed the Poverty of the Stimulus argument as it 
applies to the case of anaphoric one. Even though the focus of the present 
paper is on learnability and on the logical problem of language acquisition, we 
cannot ignore one feature of the data documented by Lidz et al. (2003). Even 
if one accepts the validity of the Poverty of the Stimulus argument the way we 
have presented it above, we are still missing an explanation for children’s 
behavior. As we have repeatedly argued, knowledge of the internal structure 
of noun phrases and knowledge of the properties of anaphoric one are 
certainly consistent with the data. However, knowledge of the internal 
structure of Noun Phrases and knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric one 
alone do not explain the data. 
Ever since the beginning of generative grammar, a crucial distinction was 
drawn between how linguistic competence is acquired and how it is put to use. 
Lidz et al. (2003) were concerned with the acquisition of linguistic 
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competence. However, it is also important to spell out their assumptions about 
how competence is put to use. In particular, a child who knows the internal 
structure of Noun Phrases and the constraint on the interpretation of anaphoric 
one will occasionally face an ambiguity. This is exactly what happened in the 
Lidz et al.’s experiment. Upon hearing ‘Look! A yellow bottle. Now look. Do 
you see another one?’, a child who has all the relevant knowledge will have to 
determine whether one refers to the upper or lower N’ in the structure in (3). 
The findings documented by Lidz et al. (2003) suggest that children prefer the 
upper N’. The question is why.  
A plausible hypothesis suggested by Tomasello (2004) and Akhtar et al. 
(2004) is that 18-month-old children simply look at the familiar object. Lidz 
and Waxman (2004) point to a previous study with 21-month-old children by 
Waxman and Markow (1998) which casts doubt on that hypothesis. We are 
still in need of an explanation. 
We would like to propose two explanations, both of which can be 
independently motivated. We will leave to further research the task of putting 
these hypotheses to the test. As far as we are concerned, we simply want to 
demonstrate that it is possible to explain the data under the scenario 
envisioned by the Poverty of the Stimulus argument.  
Our first proposal draws upon recent studies in adult sentence processing. 
This particular solution originates from the observation that the child has to 
choose between two constituents such that one contains the other. 
Descriptively, we could simply say that when facing an ambiguity of that 
kind, children favor the largest constituent. The question is then whether there 
is any way to tie this hypothesis with adults’ behavior in similar situations. A 
relevant study with adults was conducted by Frazier and Clifton (2005). 
Among other structures, these authors looked at VP-ellipsis and sluicing. The 
results suggest that when a choice is possible between two constituents such 
that one contains the other, adults do indeed show a preference for the largest 
constituent. 
A second possible explanation of the experimental findings is 
semantic/pragmatic in nature. We need to explain why the child interprets the 
instruction “Do you see another one?” as “Do you see another yellow bottle?” 
rather than “Do you see another bottle?.” One possibility is that the child 
selects the interpretation that can be answered affirmatively and felicitously 
(see Grice, 1975). The child does not see another bottle; the child sees two 
other bottles! We do not know if the 18-month-old infants who participated in 
the study said ‘yes, I do see another yellow bottle’ to the experimenter, but as 
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far as we can tell that might be all they fell short of. At first glance, the present 
solution seems to be at odds with children’s reluctance to compute scalar 
implicatures documented in previous studies (see Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, 
Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni, 2005, for a recent review). However, it must 
be kept in mind that the implicature associated with number words, which 
would seem most relevant for the present case, is by far the easiest for 
children to compute (see Papafragou and Musolino, 2003).  
Either one of the proposals sketched above accounts for the data 
documented by Lidz et al. (2003). Under either scenario, the differences 
between children and adults turn out to be quite minimal. The data can be 
explained under the assumption that children and adults employ the same 
universal processing mechanisms (see Crain and Thornton, 1998; Meroni and 
Crain, 2003a;b).  
5. Conclusion 
The present paper scrutinized the phenomenon of anaphoric one as a case 
study for language acquisition. We began with a study by Lidz et al. (2003; p. 
B72) which argued that: 
“In the domain of anaphoric reference, learnability considerations 
lead to the conclusion that learners never consider the possibility 
that an element could be anaphoric to N°. (…). This logical 
conclusion is now supported by corpus analysis and by 
experimentation with infants.” 
We argued that, under current assumptions, the experimental findings 
documented by Lidz et al. (2003) do not support that conclusion. Thus, we 
pursued a different approach, and we argued for children’s innate knowledge 
of the constraint on anaphoric one on conceptual grounds. The argument from 
the Poverty of the Stimulus may be old, but it is still valid.  
There is no doubt that experimental investigations are important. For 
instance, a study that investigated adults’ judgments of the sentences we 
started with would provide a useful contribution to the debate. When it comes 
to child language, empirical investigations can tell us whether children go 
through ‘stages of development.’ In turn, these can be used to evaluate 
different proposals about the way children select the correct grammar out of 
the possibilities given by Universal Grammar (see Yang, 2003). Similarly, 
when possible, it might be reassuring to observe that children obey a given 
constraint (see Sugisaki, 2005, for a recent successful attempt that deals with 
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another constraint on anaphoric one). Nevertheless, this should not lead us to 
undermine the value of logical arguments or to seek for supporting evidence 
with experiments that do not speak to the issue under consideration. 
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